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Centripetal Federalism
Abstract
Centripetalism is often perceived as a type of a political system for a multi-segmental, especially multi-ethnic, country in
order to create among the members of the political  elite of  integrative and moderate political  behavior cross-cutting
segmental divisions which, reaching beyond group interests, depoliticize the segmental separateness and, in this manner,
reduce their  significance.  One of  the central  institutions of  centripetalism is  decentralization leading to  a  division of  large
segments into smaller parts that inhabit different, ideally multi-segmental regions, thus inclining regional political elites of
different  segments  to  collaborate.  Although both  Nigeria  and Indonesia  have  similar  centripetal  territorial  structures,  only
Nigeria is a federation. This paper focuses on Nigerian centripetal federalism and its link to the so-called federal character
principle that is mostly consociational in substance.
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Introduction
Centripetalism, like consociationalism, is a model of a political system of power-sharing type[1], attributed to certain multi-
segmental, especially multi-ethnic countries, including Nigeria and Indonesia (Reilly 2011). Centripetalism is intended to
assure members of various (ethnic/national/religious/confessional/linguistic) segments of a share in power, but not as part of
particular  institutions  protecting  and  reinforcing  the  interests  of  individual  segments  (like  it  is  in  the  case  of
consociationalism), but in the dimension of supra-segmental, or inter-segmental institutions, i.e., institutions that are open to
individuals from all segments. Such an approach is intended, above all, to create among the members of the political elite
integrative and moderate political  behavior  cross-cutting segmental  divisions which,  reaching beyond group interests,
depoliticize  the  segmental  separateness  and,  in  this  manner,  reduce  their  significance  (Reilly,  2007:  83-91,  2011).  Thus
centripetalism,  in  contrast  to  consociationalism,  does  not  promote  institutional  recognition  of  segmental  differences  and
interests. Quite the contrary, the essence of centripetalism is to foster cooperation not so much between segments as
between  members  of  different  segments  and  even  sui  generis  forcing  them  to  cooperate  by  creating  an  integrative
institutional  framework.  The  principal  formal  centripetal  institutions  include  (Reilly  2011,  Trzciński  2018b):
1) supra-regional and inter-segmental parties and, should the need arise, coalitions between them;
2) the election of a supra-segmental (supported by members of various segments) president through the use of the so-called
territorial vote distribution requirement, i.e. the need to win an appropriately large number of votes in presidential elections
in  the  majority  of  states  or  provinces  (meeting  this  requirement  is  indispensable  to  occupy  the  presidential  office,  and
merely winning a numerical majority of votes is insufficient) (Trzciński 2017a);
3)  the  use  mainly  in  parliamentary  elections  of  electoral  systems  that  promote  cross-segmental  voting,  especially
preferential voting[2] in the form of an alternative vote in single-mandate districts or a single transferable vote in multi-
mandate districts, or some other kind of cross-segmental vote-pooling (Reilly 2020);
4) decentralization (e.g., in the form of federalization) leading to a division of large segments into smaller parts that inhabit
different, ideally multi-segmental states, thus inclining regional political elites of different segments to collaborate.
Although the central centripetal institutions have been identified in the literature, in practice, centripetalism as a model of
power-sharing  consisting  of  all  these  institutions  is  rather  a  theoretical  concept.  Although  one  may  say  that  pure
centripetalism (however, deprived of preferential  voting) did exist in Nigeria and Indonesia before those countries re-
introduced certain consociational institutions. In both Nigeria and Indonesia, the history of territorial unification, and that of
the ethnic and religious groups forming their populations following independence (in 1960 and 1949, respectively) has been
turbulent.  Both  countries  experienced  conflicts  in  relations  between  ethnic  and  religious  segments  making  up  their
population, as well as between such segments and the central government. In order to normalize these relations, they
introduced  institutions  of  power-sharing.  In  both  cases,  especially  at  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  independence,
institutions that were either consociational or corresponding to consociationalism were the preferred ones. With time,
Nigeria  and Indonesia  turned toward centripetal  institutions  since,  in  its  restricted version,  consociationalism did  not
guarantee  political  stability.  But  centripetal  institutions  also  turned  out  to  be  insufficient.  In  consequence,  with  time,
consociational institutions began to be added to the dominant centripetalism. Currently, as a consequence, in both cases, we




Although both Nigeria and Indonesia have similar centripetal territorial structures, only Nigeria is a federation. It is the most
important state on the African continent, given the size of its economy, and also the most populous. Its population reached
205 million in 2020 according to estimates, and this makes it the world’s seventh most populous state (Worldometers 2020).
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Nigeria is also a vast country with an area of nearly 924,000 km2. It is inhabited by members of about 250 ethnic groups, the
largest of which are the Hausa-Fulani (about 36% of Nigeria’s population), the Yoruba (about 15%) and the Igbo (about 15%)
(Index Mundi 2019). It is estimated that more than 53% of Nigeria’s inhabitants are Muslims, who live mainly in the north of
the country, while Christians make up about 46% of the population and live mostly in the south of the country (Index Mundi
2019).
After independence, Nigeria made use of two distinct models of federalism, one after the other: ethnic and centripetal. From
1960 to 1966, Nigeria was divided simply into several regions, initially into three (North, West, and East), and from 1963
(following the separation of the Mid-Western Region from the Western one), into four. In each of the first three regions, one
of the country’s largest ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, or the Igbo) was predominant. Nigeria’s territorial division thus
had the  characteristics  –  admissible  under  consociationalism –  of  ethnic  federalism.  Until  1967 the  northern  region,
amounting to over 2/3 of Nigeria’s area, was the most important of all, because it was inhabited by over half the country’s
population and had the greatest number of electoral votes. As a result, the Hausa-Fulani consistently sought to play a
dominant political role in the federation (Horowitz, 1985: 612).
After the army took power in 1966, centripetal federalism began to take shape in Nigeria. In 1967, after the four regions
were replaced by 12 states, the three largest ethnic groups found themselves living in as many as seven of the new
territorial units. As Horowitz (1985: 604) points out, this, along with the de-legalization by the army of ethnic parties, freed
the smaller ethnic groups from the control of regionally dominant groups and paved the road to new alliances. The situation
changed again in 1976 when, as a result of the country’s successive reorganizations of the territorial structure and the
creation of 7 new states, Nigeria now had a total of 19. Horowitz has calculated that the Hausa-Fulani then lived in about half
of them, the Yoruba in five, and the Igbo in two. Inter-state competition for a share in development projects financed by the
central  government led to an increase of  intra-ethnic disputes (Horowitz,  1985:  604-5).  What was also significant was the
fact that in the new situation over half of the states were ethnically heterogenic. Within the new multi-ethnic states, inter-
ethnic political coalitions emerged to defend state interests. Disputes at the intra-ethnic level and inter-state rivalry reduced
the risk of conflicts at the inter-ethnic and, at the same time, the federal level.
These trends became more pronounced at a later time with the introduction by the army of further changes in the territorial
division. In 1987, two more states were established in Nigeria, followed by nine in 1991, and another six in 1996. Suberu
(2006: 73-4) points out that Nigeria’s present territorial division into 36 states has led to a situation where the Hausa-Fulani
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are a majority in 9 states, the Yoruba in 7, and the Igbo in 5.
 
Federal Character Principle
The various centripetal institutions established in Nigeria, mainly in the 1970s, did not ensure a balance of power between
the three largest ethnic groups (Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo) and the two central religious communities (Muslims, Christians)
in government and appointments to public positions. Nor did they guarantee a measure of participation in power for smaller
ethnic groups.
In consequence, the requirement for public bodies in Nigeria to comply with the federal character principle was introduced to
the Constitution of 1979 (art. 14 [3]). This rule allows members and representatives of different ethnic groups and religious
communities to participate in these bodies. In keeping with the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (art. 318 [1]), the federal
character principle is to promote national unity, support national loyalty, and to give each Nigerian citizen a sense of
belonging to the nation, irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliation. Its wider aim is to strengthen the integration of a multi-
segmental society, to achieve political stability and to facilitate civilizational development.
The effect of a multi-segmental composition of the council of ministers and other public bodies in keeping with the federal
character principle can be sought in concordance with either the consociational or centripetal logic. The federal character
principle takes on a consociational essence when it introduces parity in the form of quotas in some bodies, as is the case in
the Nigerian government. The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria mandates that the cabinet be made up of at least one minister
from each of the 36 states. This minister needs to be indigenous to that state (art. 147 [3]). Nigeria’s division into 36 states,
in force since 1996, has led to a situation in which the three main ethnic groups are a majority in 21 states, while 15 states
are governed by smaller ethnic groups (Suberu, 2006: 73-4). By combining the constitutional requirement with the realities
of the territorial structure, a formal parity of regional representation in government has been established and, at the same
time – and indirectly arising from it – a parity of participation in the government of the main ethnic groups[3] and religious
communities,[4] de facto in the form of seats reserved for their members. Simultaneously members of smaller ethnic groups
were allowed to take part in the exercise of power. In the case of states in which none of Nigeria’s three main ethnic groups
is dominant, there is a greater probability of rotation of positions in government between the representatives of the smaller
indigenous ethnic groups, for example in successive cabinets, than in the case when in a given state the majority of the
population are members of one of Nigeria’s main ethnic groups.[5]
The federal character principle, in turn, seems to take on a more centripetal nature when it generally promotes in some
public bodies their multi-segmental character, as is the case in the army, for example, without having a parity character.
However, the problem lies in how, the federal character principle in the version reminiscent of centripetalism is carried out in
practice, without formally guaranteed quotas, as in the case of the army of Burundi, for example (Vandeginste, 2017: 169).
The Federal Character Commission (FCC) is the guarantor of a just division of positions in Nigerian public bodies. Specifically,
the FCC’s task is to promote, monitor, and enforce compliance with the principles of proportional sharing of all posts in
Nigeria’s public bodies (Constitution of 1999, Third Schedule, Part 1 C, art. 8 [1] [b]). Recommendations issued by the FCC,
however, show a preference for representatives of the larger ethnic groups in appointments to positions and very frequently
are of  a  quota character  (Mustapha,  2007:  11).  Ultimately,  the practice of  dividing positions is  more consociational.
Representatives of the smaller ethnic groups are the most disadvantaged by this system. The federal character principle
gives rise to criticism also on account of the fact that non-professionals are employed in various positions because they have
the “appropriate” ethnic and/or religious affiliation. The allocation of positions in public institutions on the basis of knowledge
and experience is called for, for example, by Kayode (2015).
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Conclusion
The multiple modifications of Nigeria’s territorial division after 1966 consisted of creating from the federation’s larger parts
new,  smaller  states  which,  in  the  first  years  of  Nigerian  independence,  were  part  of  the  above-mentioned  three  regions
dominated by Nigeria’s three largest ethnic groups. In addition to “breaking up” these groups so that their members would
inhabit different states and, at the same time, to creating states dominated by other groups than the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba
or the Igbo, the changes in Nigeria’s territorial structure have also led to the division of areas in the oil and natural gas rich
Niger River delta (initially mostly a part of the Eastern Region) into as many as 6 states controlled by smaller ethnic groups
(Suberu,  2006:  74).  In  consequence,  the  principal  area  of  extraction  of  energy  resources  has  been  effectively  stripped  of
domination by the Igbo who, from 1960 to 1967, had administered the Eastern Region and governed, from 1967 to 1970, the
secessionist Republic of Biafra which emerged in its stead, in its entirety or parts thereof, as the Biafra War unfolded.
The  federal  character  principle,  more  consociational  than  centripetal  in  nature,  satisfies  the  interests  of  the  main  ethnic
groups to a greater extent and those of minority groups to a lesser extent. It nonetheless creates a balance between large
segments and, in this manner, constitutes some form of revision of centripetal institutions. The federal character principle is
certainly  not  perfect  in  practice  and  has,  therefore,  many  critics,  but  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  what  relations  between
Nigeria’s largest ethnic groups and religious communities would look like if this principle was absent. Last but not least, the
formal federal character principle is supplemented by some informal institutions of consociational type. In Nigeria, the
rotation of the presidency between the North and the South (in fact between Muslims and Christians), similarly to that of the
presidency  and  vice-presidency  for  different  religious  communities  and  ethnic  groups,  increases  the  balance  of  power
between Muslims and Christians and, at the same time, between the main ethnic groups. In consequence, it helps prevent
any of the large segments from acquiring a dominant position, and this also indirectly benefits the smaller segments.
[1]  Some scholars (e.g.  Wolff,  2007) consider power-sharing just  a strategy (and a set of  political  and legal  arrangements
serving it) aimed at conflict management or resolution.
[2] Preferential voting, thanks to a ranking of candidates conducted by the voters, makes it possible for them to indicate
preferences  among  candidates  from  different  parties/organizations.  In  the  case  of  centripetalism,  the  aim  of  such  voting
would be to reduce the chances of the election to parliament of politicians showing little restraint in their political views and
actions, particularly with regard to inter-segmental relations.
[3] My discussions with Nigerian political scientists in Nigeria in 2018 indicate that the situation in which a member of an
ethnic group having a dominant status in a given state becomes minister  –  or  the “representative” of  that  state in
government – is typical.
[4]  Usually,  the  majority  of  members  of  specific  ethnic  groups  is  Christian  or  Muslim.  And so,  almost  all  Hausa-Fulani  are
Muslims, while the majority of the Yoruba and almost all Igbo are Christians.
[5] These conclusions derive from my discussions with Nigerian political scientists in Nigeria in 2018.
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